In this paper, we advocate the use of setwise contests for aggregating a set of input rankings into an output ranking. We propose a generalization of the Kemeny rule where one minimizes the number of k-wise disagreements instead of pairwise disagreements (one counts 1 disagreement each time the top choice in a subset of alternatives of cardinality at most k differs between an input ranking and the output ranking). After an algorithmic study of this k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem, we introduce a k-wise counterpart of the majority graph. It reveals useful to divide the aggregation problem into several sub-problems. We conclude with numerical tests.
Introduction
Rank aggregation aims at producing a single ranking from a collection of rankings of a fixed set of alternatives. In social choice theory (e.g., Moulin 1991) , where the alternatives are candidates to an election and each ranking represents the preferences of a voter, aggregation rules are called Social Welfare Functions (SWFs). Apart from social choice, rank aggregation has proved useful in many applications, including preference learning (Cheng and Hüllermeier, 2009; Clémençon et al., 2018) , collaborative filtering (Wang et al., 2014) , genetic map creation (Jackson et al., 2008) , similarity search in databases systems (Fagin et al., 2003) and design of web search engines (Altman and Tennenholtz, 2008; Dwork et al., 2001) . In the following, we use interchangeably the terms "input rankings" and "preferences", "output ranking" and "consensus ranking", as well as "alternatives" and "'candidates".
The well-known Arrow's impossibility theorem states that there exists no aggregation rule satisfying a small set of desirable properties (Arrow, 1950) . In the absense of an "ideal" rule, various aggregation rules have been proposed and studied. Following Fishburn's classification (1977) , we can distinguish between the SWFs for which the output ranking can be computed from the majority graph alone, those for which the output ranking can be computed from the weighted majority graph alone, and all other SWFs 1 . The majority graph is obtained from the input rankings by defining one vertex per alternative c and by adding an edge from c to c ′ if c is preferred to c ′ in a strict majority of input rankings. In the weighted majority graph, each edge is weighted by the majority margin. The many SWFs that rely on these graphs alone take therefore only pairwise comparisons into account to determine an output ranking. For a compendium of these SWFs, the interested reader may refer for instance to the book by Brandt et al. (2016) .
The importance of this class of SWFs in social choice theory can be explained by their connection with the Condorcet consistency property. This property states that, if there is a Condorcet winner (i.e., an alternative with outgoing edges to every other alternatives in the majority graph), then it should be ranked first in the output ranking. Nevertheless, as shown for instance by Baldiga and Green (2013) , the lack of Condorcet consistency is not necessarily a bad thing, because this property may come into contradiction with the objective of maximizing voters' agreement with the output ranking. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1 (Baldiga and Green, 2013) . Consider an election with 100 voters and 3 candidates c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , where 49 voters have preferences c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 , 48 have preferences c 3 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 1 and 3 have preferences c 2 ≻ c 3 ≻ c 1 . Candidate c 2 defeats every other candidate in the strict pairwise majority sense (Condorcet winner), but c 2 is the top choice of only 3 voters. In contrast, candidate c 1 is in slight minority against c 2 and c 3 , but c 1 is the top choice of 49 voters. This massive gain in agreement may justify to put c 1 instead of c 2 in first position of the output ranking.
Following Baldiga and Green (2013) , we propose to handle this tension between the pairwise comparisons (leading to ranking c 2 first) and the plurality choice (leading to ranking c 1 first) by using SWFs that take into account not only pairwise comparisons but setwise contests. More precisely, given input rankings on a set C of candidates and k ∈ {2, . . . , |C|}, the idea is to consider the plurality score of each candidate c for each subset S ⊆ C such that 2 ≤ |S| ≤ k, where the plurality score of c for S is the number of voters for which c is the top choice in S. The results of setwise contests for the preferences of Example 1 are given in Table 1 for k = 3. Note that the three top rows obviously encode the same information as the weighted majority graph while the bottom row makes it possible to detect the tension between the pairwise comparisons and the plurality choice.
One can then define a new class of SWFs, those that rely on the results of setwise contests alone to determine an output ranking. The many works that have been carried out regarding voting rules based on the (weighted) majority graph can be revisited in this broader setting.
This line of research has already been investigated by Lu and Boutilier 2010 and Baldiga and Green 2013 . However, note that both of these works consider a setting where candidates may become unavailable after voters express their preferences. We do not make this assumption. We indeed believe that this new class of SWFs makes sense in the standard setting where the set of candidates is known and deterministic, as it amounts to generate an output ranking by examining the choices that are made by the voters on subsets of candidates of various sizes (while usually only pairwise choices are considered).
An SWF that seem natural in this class consists in determining an output ranking that minimizes the number of disagreements with the results of setwise contests for sets of cardinality at most k. This is a k-wise generalization of the Kemeny rule, which is obtained as a special case for k = 2. We recall that the Kemeny rule consists in producing a ranking that minimizes the number of pairwise disagreements (Kemeny, 1959) .
Example 2. Let us come back to Example 1 and assume that we use the 3-wise Kemeny rule. Consider the output ranking r = c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 . For set S = {c 1 , c 2 }, the number of disagreements with the results of setwise contests is 51 because c 2 is the top choice in S for 51 voters (see Table 1 ) while it is c 1 for r. Similarly, the number of disagreements induced by {c 1 , c 3 }, {c 2 , c 3 } and {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 } are respectively 51, 48 and 3 + 48. The total number of disagreements is thus 51 + 51 + 48 + 3 + 48 = 201. This is actually the minimum number of disagreements that can be achieved for these input rankings, which makes r the k-wise Kemeny ranking.
The purpose of this paper is to study the k-wise Kemeny aggregation problem. Section 2 formally defines the problem and reports on related work. Section 3 is devoted to some axiomatic considerations of the corresponding voting rule, and to an algorithmic study of the problem. We then investigate a k-wise variant of the majority graph in Section 4. We prove that determining this graph is easy for k = 3 but becomes NP-hard for k > 3, and we show how to use it in a preprocessing step to speed up the computation of the output ranking. Numerical tests are presented in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Adopting the terminology of social choice theory, we consider an election with a set V of n voters and a set C of m candidates. Each voter v has a complete and transitive preference order r v over candidates (also called ranking). The collection of these rankings defines a preference profile P.
Notations and Definitions
Let us introduce some notations related to rankings. We denote by R(C) the set of m! rankings over C. Given a ranking r and two candidates c and c ′ , we write c ≻ r c ′ if c is in a higher position than c ′ in r. Given a ranking r and a candidate c, rk(c, r) denotes the rank of c in r. For instance, rk(c, r v ) = 1 if c is the preferred candidate of voter v (the candidate ranked highest in r v ). Given a ranking r and a set S ⊆ C, we define r S as the restriction of r to S and t r (S) as the top choice (i.e., preferred candidate) in S according to r. Similarly, given a preference profile P and a set S ⊆ C, we define P S as the restriction of P to S. Lastly, we denote by tail k (r) (resp. head k (r)) the subranking compounded of the k least (resp. most) preferred candidates in r.
We are interested in SWFs which, given a preference profile P, should return a consensus ranking which yields a suitable compromise between the preferences in P. One of the most wellknown SWFs is the Kemeny rule, which selects a ranking r with minimal Kendall tau distance to P. Denoting by δ KT (r, r ′ ) the Kendall tau distance between rankings r and r ′ , the distance δ KT (r, P) between a ranking r and a profile P reads as:
Stated differently, δ KT measures the distance between two rankings by the number of pairwise disagreements between them. The distance between a ranking and a preference profile is then obtained by summation.
However, the Kendall tau distance only takes into account pairwise comparisons, which may entail counterintuitive results as illustrated by Example 1. To address this issue, the Kendall tau distance can be generalized to take into consideration disagreements on sets of cardinal greater than two. Given a set S ⊆ C and t ≤ m, we denote by ∆ t (S) the set of subsets of S of cardinal lower than or equal to t, i.e., ∆ t (S) = {S ′ ⊆ S s.t. |S ′ | ≤ t}. When S is not specified, it is assumed to be C, i.e., ∆ t = ∆ t (C). For k ≥ 2, the k-wise Kendall tau distance δ k KT between r and r ′ is defined by:
In other words, δ k KT measures the distance between two rankings by the number of top-choice disagreements on sets of cardinal lower than or equal to k.
Note that δ k KT has all the properties of a distance: non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles, symmetry and triangle inequality (see Proposition 2 in Appendix A). Secondly, as mentioned in the introduction, we have δ 2 KT = δ KT . Thirdly and maybe most importantly, we point out that the distances induced by δ k KT (r, r ′ ) can be computed in O(m 3 ) by using the following formula: 
, otherwise c and c ′ would not be the top choices. Hence the formula.
The distance δ k KT induces a new SWF, the k-wise Kemeny rule, which, given a profile P, returns a ranking r with minimal distance δ k KT to P, where:
Note that this coincides with the rule we used in the introduction, by commutativity of addition:
Determining a consensus ranking for this rule defines the k-KAP optimization problem (for k-wise Kemeny Aggregation Problem). 
Related Work
Several other variants of the Kemeny rule have been proposed in the literature, either to obtain generalizations able to deal with partial or weak orders (Dwork et al., 2001; Zwicker, 2018) , to penalize more some pairwise disagreements than others (Kumar and Vassilvitskii, 2010) , or to account for candidates that may become unavailable after voters express their preferences (Baldiga and Green, 2013; Lu and Boutilier, 2010) . Indeed, despite its popularity, the Kemeny rule has received several criticisms. One of them is that the Kendall tau distance counts equally the disagreements on every pair of candidates. This property is undesirable in many settings. For instance, with a web search engine, a disagreement on a pair of web pages with high positions in the considered rankings should have a higher cost than a disagreement on pairs of web pages with lower ones. This drawback motivated the introduction of weighted Kendall tau distances by Kumar and Vassilvitskii 2010 . We compare our work to theirs in Appendix B and show that the k-wise Kendall tau distance is also well suited to penalize more the disagreements involving alternatives at the top of the input rankings, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 3. Consider rankings r 1 , r 2 , r 3 defined by c 1 ≻ r 1 c 2 ≻ r 1 c 3 , c 1 ≻ r 2 c 3 ≻ r 2 c 2 , and c 2 ≻ r 3 c 1 ≻ r 3 c 3 . We have δ KT (r 1 , r 2 ) = δ KT (r 1 , r 3 ) = 1 while δ 3 KT (r 1 , r 2 ) = 1 < 2 = δ 3 KT (r 1 , r 3 ) because r 1 and r 3 disagree on both subsets {c 1 , c 2 } and {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. Put another way, δ 3 KT (r 1 , r 3 ) > δ 3 KT (r 1 , r 2 ) because r 1 and r 3 disagree on their top-ranked alternatives whereas r 1 and r 2 disagree on the alternatives ranked in the last places.
The two works closest to ours are related to another extension of the Kemeny rule. This extension considers a setting in which, besides the fact that voters have preferences over a set C, the election will in fact occur on a subset S ⊆ C drawn according to a probability distribution (Baldiga and Green, 2013; Lu and Boutilier, 2010) . The optimization problem considered is then to find a consensus ranking r which minimizes, in expectation, the number of voters' disagreements with the chosen candidate in S (a voter v disagrees if t rv (S) = t r (S)). The differences between the work of Baldiga and Green 2013 and the one of Lu and Boutilier 2010 is then twofold. Firstly, while Baldiga and Green mostly focused on the axiomatic properties of this aggregation procedure, the work of Lu and Boutilier has more of an algorithmic flavor. Secondly, while Baldiga and Green mostly study a setting in which the probability P(S) of S is only dependent on its cardinality (i.e., P(S) is only a function of |S|), Lu and Boutilier study a setting that can be viewed as a special case of the former, where each candidate is absent of S independently of the others with a probability p (i.e., P(S) = p |C\S| (1 − p) |S| ). The Kemeny aggregation problem can be formulated in both settings, either by defining P(S) = 0 for |S| ≥ 3, or by defining a probability p that is "sufficiently high" w.r.t. the size of the instance (Lu and Boutilier, 2010) . Lu and Boutilier conjectured that the determination of a consensus ranking is NP-hard in their setting, designed an exact method based on mathematical programming, two approximation greedy algorithms and a PTAS.
Our model can be seen as a special case of the model of Baldiga and Green where the set S is drawn uniformly at random within the set of subsets of C of cardinal smaller than or equal to a given constant k ≥ 2. While it cannot be casted in the specific setting studied by Lu and Boutilier, our model is closely related and may be used to obtain new insights on their work.
Aggregation with the k-wise Kemeny Rule
In this section, we investigate the axiomatic properties of the k-wise Kemeny rule, and then we turn to the algorithmic study of k-KAP.
Axiomatic Properties of the k-wise Kemeny Rule
Several properties of the k-wise Kemeny rule have already been studied by Baldiga and Green 2013, because their setting includes the k-wise Kemeny rule as a special case. Among other things, they showed that the rule is not Condorcet consistent. That is to say, a Condorcet winner may not be ranked first in any consensus ranking even when one exists, as illustrated by Example 2.
The authors also show that the k-wise Kemeny rule is neutral, i.e., all candidates are treated equally, and that for k ≥ 3 it is different from any positional method or any method that uses only the pairwise majority margins (among which is the standard Kemeny rule). We provide here some additional properties satisfied by the k-wise Kemeny rule:
• Monotonicity: up-ranking cannot harm a winner; down-ranking cannot enable a loser to win.
• Unanimity: if all voters rank c before c ′ , then c is ranked before c ′ in any consensus ranking.
• Reinforcement: let R * P and R * P ′ denote the sets of consensus rankings for preference profiles P and P ′ respectively. If R * P ∩ R * P ′ = ∅ and P ′′ is the profile obtained by concatenating P and P ′ , then R * P ′′ = R * P ∩ R * P ′ .
While the fact that the k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies reinforcement is quite obvious from its definition, the monotonicity and unanimity conditions are proved in Appendix C (see Propositions 5 and 6). Besides, the k-wise Kemeny rule does not satisfy Independence of irrelevant alternatives, i.e., the relative positions of two candidates in a consensus ranking can depend on the presence of other candidates. Let us illustrate this point with the following example.
Example 4. Considering the preference profile from Example 1, the only consensus ranking for δ 3
KT is c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 . Yet, without c 3 the only consensus ranking would be c 2 ≻ c 1 .
Lastly, note that there exists a noise model such that the k-wise Kemeny rule can be interpreted as a maximum likelihood estimator (Conitzer et al., 2009) . In this view of voting, one assumes that there exists a "correct" ranking r, and each vote corresponds to a noisy perception of this correct ranking. Consider the conditional probability measure P on R(C) defined by P(r ′ |r) ∝ e −δ k KT (r,r ′ ) . It is easy to convince oneself that the k-wise Kemeny rule returns a ranking r * that maximizes P(P |r * ) = r ′ ∈P P(r ′ |r * ) and is thus a maximum likelihood estimate of r.
Computational Complexity of k-KAP
We now turn to the algorithmic study of k-KAP. After providing a hardness result, we will design an efficient Fixed Parameter Tractable (FPT) algorithm for parameter m.
While k-KAP is obviously NP-hard for k = 2 as it then corresponds to determining a consensus ranking w.r.t. the Kemeny rule, we strengthen this result by showing that it is also NP-hard for any constant value k ≥ 3. The proof, which is deferred to Appendix C, uses a reduction from 2-KAP.
Theorem 1. For any constant k ≥ 3, k-KAP is NP-hard, even if the number of voters equals 4 or if the average range of candidates equals 2 (where the range of a candidate c is defined by max r∈P rk(c, r) − min r∈P rk(c, r) + 1 and the average is taken over all candidates).
Despite this result, k-KAP is obviously FPT w.r.t. the number m of candidates, by simply trying the m! rankings in R(C). We now design a dynamic programming procedure which significantly improves this time complexity.
Proposition 1. If r * is an optimal ranking for k-KAP, then δ k KT (r * , P) = d k KT (C), where, for any subset S ⊆ C, d k KT (S) is defined by the recursive relation:
. Given a preference profile P over C and a rankingr ∈ R c (S), the summation defining δ k KT (r, P S ) breaks down as follows:
Using the same reasoning as in Equation 1 on page 4, the second summand in Equation 3 can be rewritten as follows:
Consider now a ranking r * ∈ R(S) such that δ k KT (r * , P S ) = min r∈R(S) δ k KT (r, P S ). We have:
because the second summand in Equation 4 does not depend onr (it only depends on c, which is the argument of the min). If one denotes min r∈R(S) δ k KT (r, P S ) by d k KT (S), one obtains Equation 2. This concludes the proof.
A candidate c ∈ S that realizes the minimum in Equation 2 can be ranked in first position in an optimal ranking for P S . Once d k KT (S) is computed for each S ⊆ C, a ranking r * achieving the optimal value d k KT (C) can thus be determined recursively starting from S = C. The complexity of the induced dynamic programming method is O(2 m m 2 n) because there are 2 m subsets S ⊆ C to consider and each value d k KT (S) is computed in O(m 2 n) by Equation 2. The min operation is indeed performed on m values and the sum c ′ ≻rc
can be computed incrementally in O(m), which entails an O(mn) complexity for the second summand in Equation 2 (the n factor is of course due to the sum over all r ∈ P S ). Note that the computation of all binomial coefficients p i for i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2} and p ∈ {i, . . . , m − 2} can be performed in O(mk) in a preliminary step thanks to Pascal's formula.
The k-Wise Majority Digraph
We now propose and investigate a k-wise counterpart of the pairwise majority digraph, that will be used in a preprocessing procedure for k-KAP.
As stated in the introduction, the pairwise Kemeny rule is strongly related to the pairwise majority digraph. We denote by G P the pairwise majority digraph associated to profile P. We recall that in this digraph, there is one vertex per candidate, and there is an arc from candidate c to candidate c ′ if a strict majority of voters prefers c to c ′ . In the weighted pairwise majority
Example 5. Consider a profile P with 10 voters and 6 candidates such that:
Figure 1: k-wise majority digraph in Example 5 for k = 2 (left) and k = 3 (right).
From G P , we can define a set of consistent rankings:
Definition 1. Consider a digraph G whose vertices correspond to the candidates in C. Let B 1 (G), . . . , B t(G) (G) denote the subsets of C corresponding to the Strongly Connected Components (SCCs) of G, and O(G) denote the set of linear orders
, we say that a ranking r is consistent with < G if the candidates in B i are ranked before the ones of B j when i < G j.
The following result states that, for any < G P ∈ O(G P ), there exists a consensus ranking for δ KT among the rankings consistent with < G P .
Theorem 2 (Theorem 16 in reference Charon and Hudry, 2010) . Let P be a profile over C and assume that the SCCs of G P are numbered according to a linear order < G P ∈ O(G P ). Consider the ranking r * , consistent with < G P , obtained by the concatenation of rankings r * 1 , . . . ,
That is, r * is a consensus ranking according to the Kemeny rule 
This result does not hold anymore if one uses δ k KT (with k ≥ 3) instead of δ KT , as shown by the following example.
Example 6. Let us denote by P the profile of Example 1. The pairwise majority digraph G P has three SCCs
In order to adapt Theorem 2 to the k-wise Kemeny rule, we now introduce the concept of 
) then, in a consensus ranking r for δ k KT where c and c ′ would be consecutive, it is possible (resp. necessary) that c ≻ r c ′ .
The k-wise majority digraph associated to a profile P over a set C of candidates is the weighted
The weight w k P (c, c ′ ) of this arc is then given by: 
Example 7. The meta-graph of SCCs of G 3 P in Example 5 is represented in Figure 2 . The above result implies that there exists a consensus ranking among c Figure 2 : The meta-graph of strongly connected components of G 3 P in Example 5.
To take advantage of Theorem 3, one could try 1) to index the SCCs of G k P according to a linear order < G k P ∈ O(G k P ), and then 2) to work on each SCC separately, before concatenating the obtained rankings. However, for a consensus ranking consistent with < G k P , the relative positions
can be captured in the dynamic programming procedure by applying a modified version of Equation 2 separately for each subset
. Formally, if r * is optimal for k-KAP, then:
It amounts to replacing S by S∪B >i in the second summand of Equation 2 to take into account the fact that there exists a consensus ranking where all the candidates of B >i are ranked after those of
≥i is the ranking obtained by the concatenation of rankings r * i , . . . , r * t(G k ) in this order. The ranking r * ≥1 of C is a consensus ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule. Given Theorem 3, the k-wise majority digraph thus seems like a promising tool to boost the computation of a consensus ranking. Unfortunately, the following negative result holds, whose proof is deferred to Appendix D.
Theorem 4. Given a profile P and two candidates c and c ′ ,
Consequently, computing the digraph G k P from P is NP-hard for k ≥ 4. In contrast, the digraph G 3 P can be computed in polynomial time. Indeed, given a set S ⊂ C such that {c, c ′ } ⊆ S, adding an element x ∈ C \S to S increases φ 3 P (S, c, c ′ ) by one for each r ∈ P such that c ≻ r c ′ and c ≻ r x. Let us denote by P c≻c ′ the set {r ∈ P s.
Note that one can take advantage of the meta-graph of SCCs to trim the graph G k P if one looks for a consensus ranking r * consistent with a specific order < G k P ∈ O(G k P ). It may indeed happen that, for an edge (c, c ′ ), the weight w k P (c, c ′ ) = w k P (S, c, c ′ ) > 0 corresponds to a set S which contains candidates that will never be below c in r * . Conversely, the set S may omit candidates that are necessarily below c in r * . These constraints can be induced by either unanimity dominance relations or by < G k P . The following example illustrates this idea.
Example 8. Let us refine the digraph G 3 P previously obtained for the profile P of Example 5. The SCCs are
This set contains c 2 while it is necessarily above c 3 in a consistent ranking. Conversely, candidates c 5 and c 6 are omitted while they are necessarily below c 3 . By taking into account these constraints, we obtain that a set maximizing w 3 P (S, c 3 , c 4 ) is S = {c 3 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 }, for which w 3 P (S, c 3 , c 4 ) = −4. Hence, we can remove the arc (c 3 , c 4 ) from G 3 P . Similarly, it is possible to show that the arc (c 6 , c 5 ) can be removed from G 3 P . Thanks to these refinement steps, we can conclude that a consensus ranking is
Numerical Tests
Our numerical tests 3 have three objectives: we evaluate the computational performance of the dynamic programming approach of Section 3, we evaluate the impact of parameter k on the set of consensus rankings, and we assess the efficiency of the preprocessing technique of Section 4.
Generation of preference profiles. The preference profiles are generated according to the Mallows model (Mallows, 1957) , using the Python package PrefLib-Tools (Mattei and Walsh, 2013) . This model takes two parameters as input: a reference ranking σ (the mode of the distribution) and a dispersion parameter φ ∈ (0, 1). Given these inputs, the probability of generating a ranking r is proportional to φ δKT(r,σ) . The more φ tends towards 0 (resp. 1), the more the preference rankings become correlated and resemble σ (resp. become equally probable, i.e., we are close to the impartial culture assumption). This model makes it possible to measure in an efficient and simple way how the level of correlation in the input rankings impacts our results. In all tests, the number n of voters is set to 50 and the ranking σ is set arbitrarily as the k-wise Kemeny rule is neutral. For each triple (m, k, φ) considered, the results are averaged over 50 instances of preference profiles.
Practicability of the dynamic programming approach. We first evaluate our dynamic programming approach on instances with different values for parameters m and k. Note that the computational performance measured here is not impacted by the level of correlation in the input rankings as it does not change the number of states in the dynamic programming algorithm nor the computation time to determine the optimal value in each of these states. Hence, we only consider instances generated under the impartial culture assumption, i.e., with φ ≈ 1. Table 2 (Rows 3-5) displays the average, max and min running times obtained for some representative (m, k) values. As expected, the running times increase exponentially with m. Conversely, parameter k seems to have a moderate impact on the running times. The dynamic programming approach enables us to solve k-KAP in a time of up to 3 sec. (resp. 76 sec.) for m ≤ 14 (resp. m ≤ 18).
Influence of k on the set of consensus rankings. Second, we study the impact of parameter k on the set of optimal solutions to k-KAP. Indeed, one criticism for the Kemeny rule is that there exists instances for which the set of consensus rankings is compounded of many solutions which are quite different from one another. Thus, we investigate if increasing the value of k helps in mitigating this issue. For this purpose, we consider the same instances as before and compute the average number of consensus rankings.
The results are displayed in the sixth row of Table 2 , where the average number of consensus rankings is denoted by |R * | avg . Interestingly, we observe that this measure decreases quickly with k. For instance, when m = 18, |R * | avg is divided by 5 when k increases from 2 to 9 and is below 2 when k = m. The intuition is that the distance δ k KT becomes more fine grained as k increases. Impact of the 3-wise majority graph. Lastly, we study the impact of the preprocessing method proposed in Section 4 for k = 3. This preprocessing uses the k-wise majority digraph to divide k-KAP into several subproblems which can be solved separately by dynamic programming. Hopefully, when voters' preferences are correlated (i.e., for "small" φ values), these subproblems become smaller and more numerous, making the preprocessing more efficient.
The results are shown in Table 3 , where the results obtained without preprocessing are also given in the last column. We observe that the running times are highly dependent on the value of φ. For instance, with m = 18, the average running time for solving 3-KAP is above 1 minute if φ = 0.95 while it is below 1 second if φ ≤ 0.85. Note that this gap is necessarily related to the preprocessing step, since, as already stated, parameter φ has no impact on the running time of the dynamic programming approach. To explain this significant speed-up, we display in Table 4 the average size of the largest SCC of the 3-wise majority digraph at the end of the preprocessing step. Unsurprisingly, this average size turns out to be correlated with φ. Indeed, when φ ≤ 0.5, the size of the largest SCC is almost always 1. Hence, the preprocessing step is likely to yield directly a consensus ranking. In contrast, when φ = 0.95, the average size of the largest SCC is close to m, thus the impact of the preprocessing is low. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we advocate using the results of setwise contests between candidates to design social welfare functions that are less myopic than those only based on pairwise comparisons. In this direction, we have studied a k-wise generalization of the Kemeny rule, and established that determining a consensus ranking is NP-hard for any k ≥ 3. After proposing a dynamic programming procedure, we have investigated a k-wise variant of the majority graph, from which we developed a preprocessing step. Computing this graph is a polynomial time problem for k = 3 but becomes NP-hard for k ≥ 4. The numerical tests show the practicability of the approach for up to 18 candidates. A natural research direction is to investigate the complexity of determining a consensus ranking for δ k KT when k = m, because our hardness result only holds for fixed values of k. Another avenue to explore is to propose alternative definitions of k-wise majority graphs that are easier to calculate for k > 3. Finally, other social welfare functions based on the results of setwise contests are worth investigating in our opinion, both from the axiomatic and the computational points of view.
A Deferred Proofs of Section 2
Proposition 2. The function δ k KT has all the properties of a distance: non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles, symmetry and triangle inequality.
Proof. Non-negativity and symmetry are obvious from the definition of δ k KT . It also verifies identity of indiscernibles: if δ k KT (r, r ′ ) = 0, then rankings r and r ′ must in particular agree on each pairwise comparison, hence δ KT (r, r ′ ) = 0 and r = r ′ because δ KT verifies identity of indiscernibles. Lastly, triangular inequality comes from the fact that given three rankings r 1 , r 2 and r 3 and a set S, ½ tr 1 (S) =tr 3 (S) ≤ ½ tr 1 (S) =tr 2 (S) + ½ tr 2 (S) =tr 3 (S) .
Proposition 3. Given two rankings r and r ′ , δ k KT (r, r ′ ) can be computed in O(m 3 ) by using the following formula: B Comparison between the k-wise Kendall tau distance and the position weighted Kendall tau distance
We relate here the k-wise Kemeny rule to another extension of the Kemeny rule that was introduced by Kumar and Vassilvistkii 2010 . They proposed that disagreements on highly ranked candidates be more costly than disagreements on lowly ranked ones. To achieve this, they defined a position-weighted version of Kendall tau, denoted by δ w KT , where an inversion of the two candidates at positions i and i − 1 has a cost w i . For convenience, a cost w 1 = 1 is also defined. Given the costs w i , one can then measure the average swap-cost of moving a candidate from position i to j by computing the ratio
This observation motivated the following definition for a position-weighted version of Kendall tau (Kumar and Vassilvitskii, 2010) :
Stated otherwise, if two rankings r and r ′ disagree on a pairwise comparison between two candidates c and c ′ , then the cost of this disagreement is weighted by the product of the average swap-cost of moving c from its position in r to its position in r ′ with the average swap-cost of moving c ′ from its position in r to its position in r ′ . Note that if w i = 1 for all i in {1, . . . , m}, one obtains the usual Kendall tau distance. Both the position-weighted Kendall tau distance and the k-wise Kendall tau distance can be used in order to penalize more strongly disagreements on candidates with high ranks (i.e., candidates that appear near the top of the ranking). For the k-wise Kendall tau distance, this property results from the fact that for a pair {c, c ′ } such that t r ({c, c ′ }) = t r ′ ({c, c ′ }) the number of resulting subsets S for which t r (S) = t r ′ (S) is all the larger as c and c ′ are ranked high in r and r ′ . Note however that the position-weighted Kendall tau distance requires to specify the m − 1 parameters w 2 , . . . , w m , the tuning of which does not seem to be obvious. In comparison, the k-wise Kendall tau distance only requires to choose the value of k, from which the cost of each disagreement on a pair {c, c ′ } of candidates is naturally entailed: it corresponds to the number of subsets of C of size less than or equal to k for which the top choice in r is c while the top choice in r ′ is c ′ (see Section 2 for the formal expression of swap-costs according to k). We now prove that the k-wise Kendall tau distance is not equivalent to any position-weighted Kendall tau distance if k ≥ 3.
Proposition 4. The k-wise Kendall tau distance is not equivalent to any position-weighted Kendall tau distance if k ≥ 3.
Proof. We consider an election with 3 candidates, i.e., C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. Note that as there are only three candidates, each k-wise Kendall tau distance with k ≥ 3 is equivalent to the 3-wise Kendall tau distance. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists weights w 2 and w 3 such that for any rankings r and r ′ in R(C), we have δ w KT (r, r ′ ) = δ 3 KT (r, r ′ ). For r = c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 and r ′ = c 2 ≻ c 1 ≻ c 3 this leads to w 2 = √ 2. If r = c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 and r ′ = c 1 ≻ c 3 ≻ c 2 this leads to w 3 = 1. Lastly, with r = c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 and r ′ = c 3 ≻ c 1 ≻ c 2 , we obtain:
which yields the desired contradiction.
C Deferred Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 5. The k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Let r be a ranking and v be a voter such that c and c ′ are consecutive in r v and c ′ ≻ rv c. Let us denote by r c↔c ′ v the ranking obtained from r v by switching the positions of c and c ′ . Then, the sets S for which t rv (S
Furthermore, if such a set S contains a candidate c ′′ such that c ′′ ≻ r t r ({c, c ′ }), then we will both have t r (S) = t rv (S) and t r (S) = t r c↔c ′ v (S). Hence, the sets which account for the difference between δ k KT (r, r v ) and δ k
. More precisely, using Equation 1, we obtain that δ k KT (r, r c↔c ′ v ) is equal to:
Hence, δ k KT (r, r v ) will decrease if r ranks c before c ′ and the decrease is maximal when c is ranked first in r (because it maximizes |B c ′ (r v ) ∩ B c (r)|). Repeating this argument shows that no winner is harmed by up-ranking. Similarly, δ k KT (r, r v ) will increase if r ranks c ′ before c and the increase is maximal when c ′ is ranked first in r (because it maximizes |B c (r v ) ∩ B c ′ (r)|). Repeating this argument shows that no loser can win by down-ranking.
Proposition 6. The k-wise Kemeny rule satisfies unanimity.
Proof. Let c, c ′ ∈ C be two candidates and P be a preference profile such that for all ranking r ′′ in P, c ≻ r ′′ c ′ . Let r be a ranking such that c ′ ≻ r c, and r ′ be the ranking obtained from r by exchanging the positions of c ′ and c. Moreover, let K denote the set of candidates between c and c ′ in r. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that r minimizes δ k KT (·, P). We will prove that for any r ′′ ∈ P, δ k KT (r ′ , r ′′ ) < δ k KT (r, r ′′ ). Let r ′′ ∈ P and S ⊆ C such that t r ′ (S) = t r ′′ (S) and t r (S) = t r ′′ (S). Then S must contain either c or c ′ , and does not contain any element ranked higher than c ′ in r because otherwise we would have t r (S) = t r ′ (S). This implies that either
. These situations are exclusive: there cannot be both c and c ′ in S as we cannot have t r ′′ (S) = c ′ if c ∈ S. To sum up, there are two possibilities:
1. t r ′ (S) = c and t r ′′ (S) = t r (S) = c ′′ is in K. This implies that c ′′ is the second choice of r ′ in S and that c ′′ ≻ r ′′ c ′ as c ′′ ≻ r ′′ c. In this case, necessarily, c ′ ∈ S and we consider
2. t r ′ (S) ∈ K and t r ′′ (S) = t r (S) = c ′ . In this case, necessarily, c ∈ S and we consider S ′ = S ∪ {c}.
In both cases, we obtain a set S ′ such that t r ′ (S ′ ) = t r ′′ (S ′ ) and t r (S ′ ) = t r ′′ (S ′ ). Note that any set S will induce a different S ′ and that {c, c ′ } is not one of these sets S ′ . As we also have t r ′ ({c, c ′ }) = t r ′′ ({c, c ′ }) and t r ({c, c ′ }) = t r ′′ ({c, c ′ }), this proves that for any r ′′ ∈ P, δ k KT (r ′ , r ′′ ) < δ k KT (r, r ′′ ) and hence the claim.
To prove Theorem 1, we first state two lemmata.
Lemma 1. If the candidates in a set S ⊆ C are ranked in the |S| last positions by every voters and in the same order, then for any k ≥ 2, any consensus ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule has the same property.
Proof. This is a simple consequence of the unanimity property that is satisfied by the k-wise Kemeny rule.
Lemma 2. For any p ∈ N * and ε ∈ (0, 1 2p ) we have the following inequality:
(1 + ε) p < 1 + 2pε
Proof. We prove the claim by induction. It is obvious for p = 1. Consider the claim true for p = k, then for ε ∈ (0, 1 2(k+1) )
where the first inequality uses the induction hypothesis and the second inequality uses the fact that 2kε 2 < ε because 2kε < 1 for ε ∈ (0, 1 2(k+1) ).
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof. We obtain our hardness result via a reduction from the standard Kemeny aggregation problem (2-KAP), which is known to be NP-hard (Bartholdi et al., 1989) . Consider a preference profile P with n ≥ 1 voters and m ≥ k ≥ 3 candidates. Note that we can assume m ≥ k as k is a constant and 2-KAP is fixed parameter tractable w.r.t. m (Betzler et al., 2009) . We add to the problem λ = 4nm 4 candidates c * 1 , . . . , c * λ that are ranked last by all voters and in the same order, i.e., c * 1 ≻ r . . . ≻ r c * λ for all r in P. We denote the resulting set of candidates by C ′ (i.e., C ′ = C ∪ {c * 1 , . . . , c * λ }) and the resulting preference profile by P ′ . By using Lemma 1, we will restrict our attention to rankings that rank these additional voters last and in the same order as the voters, because they are the only possible consensus rankings.
Given two such rankings r and r ′ , we have by Equation 1 that δ k KT (r, r ′ ) is equal to:
Consequently:
; from which we obtain:
If one sets λ = 4nm 4 , the following inequalities hold:
where the second inequality follows from 4nm 4 /(4nm 4 − i) ≤ 2 for i ∈ 1, m .
From Equation 6, we deduce then:
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2 with ε = 1 2nm 3 because 1 2nm 3 < 1 2m for m ≥ 3. Coming back to Equation 5, this implies:
and therefore:
Our hardness claim is due to the fact that a ranking r * minimizing δ k KT (r, P ′ ) must be such that r * C minimizes δ KT (r C , P). Indeed, assume r * C does not minimize δ KT (r C , P) and considerr so thatr C does, then δ k KT (r, P ′ )<δ k KT (r * , P ′ ) as:
It is known that 2-KAP is NP-hard even if the number n of voters equals 4 (Dwork et al., 2001) and even if the average range of candidates equals 2 (Betzler et al., 2009) . As the reduction above preserves the number of voters and decreases the average range of candidates, the same results hold for k-KAP.
Observation 1. There exists instances with arbitrary large sets of candidates such that the k-wise Kemeny rule differs from the Kemeny rule.
Proof. Consider the election described in Example 1, then the only k-wise Kemeny consensus ranking is c 1 ≻ c 2 ≻ c 3 , while the only pairwise Kemeny consensus ranking is c 2 ≻ c 3 ≻ c 1 . Now we modify the preference profile of the previous election by adding candidates c 4 to c k , with k arbitrarily large such that for any ranking r in the new preference profile, head k−3 (r) = c k ≻ c k−1 ≻ . . . ≻ c 4 . With this new preference profile, the only k-wise Kemeny consensus ranking
D Deferred Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 3. Let P be a profile over C and assume that the SCCs of G k P are numbered according to a linear order < G k P ∈ O(G k P ). Among the rankings consistent with < G k P , there exists a consensus ranking w.r.t. the k-wise Kemeny rule. Proof. We make a reduction from the set cover problem. Given a set of elements X = {x 1 , . . . , x p } and a collection of sets of elements of X , T = {T 1 , . . . , T q }, we need to determine if there exists a subcollection K ⊆ T of at most b sets that covers X . We assume that no set in T contains X as otherwise the problem is trivial. Furthermore, we assume that no element in X is contained in all sets of T as otherwise this element could be discarded from the instance as any solution would cover this element. We now detail the preference profile that we create from an instance of the set cover problem.
Set of candidates:
We will create a profile such that max S∈∆ m cc ′ w k P (S, c, c ′ ) > 0 iff the answer to the set cover problem is yes for the instance under consideration. More precisely, we will show that if X cannot be covered by a subcollection K ⊆ T with less than b sets, then w k P (S, c, c ′ ) < 0 for all S in ∆ m cc ′ . Otherwise, if set X can be covered with a subcollection K ⊆ T with less than b sets, then there exists a set S in ∆ m cc ′ such that w k P (S, c, c ′ ) > 0. In addition to candidates c and c ′ , for each pair (i, t) such that x i ∈ T t we create a candidate c it . Moreover, for each set T t we create a candidate c t . In the sequel, we may call candidates c it element candidates and candidates c t set candidates. This process yields at most pq + 2 candidates ((p − 1)q + q + 2). The candidates c it and c t will make the correspondence with the subcollection K: the candidate c t will be in the set S iff T t ∈ K and the candidate c it will be in the set S if T t is added to K in order to cover x i .
Set of voters:
For each pair (i, t) such that x i ∈ T t , we create 2b voters v s it (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b}) with the same ranking r it such that tail 4 (r it ) = c ≻ c it ≻ c t ≻ c ′ . For each element x i ∈ X , we create 2b voters v s i (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b}) with the same ranking r i such that tail u+2 (r i ) = c ′ ≻ c it 1 ≻ . . . ≻ c itu ≻ c where T t 1 , T t 2 , . . . , T tu are the different sets that contain x i . For each set T t we create 2b|T t | + 2 voters v s t (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2b|T t | + 2}) with the same ranking r t such that tail 3 (r t ) = c ′ ≻ c t ≻ c. Lastly, we create 2q + 1 + 2b voters v s (s ∈ {1, . . . , 2q + 1 + 2b}) with the same ranking r such that tail 2 (r) = c ≻ c ′ . In the end, we obtain O(bpq) voters. Note that P can be build with no unanimity dominance relationship between two candidates.
We now show that, given k ≥ 4, we have max S∈∆ m cc ′ w k P (S, c, c ′ ) > 0 iff the answer to the set cover problem is yes. Now let us look at how adding an element to S starting from S = {c, c ′ } modifies values φ k P (S, c, c ′ ) and φ k P (S, c ′ , c). We will assume without loss of generality that we add set candidates before element candidates.
• If we assume S is only composed of c, c ′ and set candidates, then adding a candidate c t to it results in adding 2b|T t | to φ k P (S, c, c ′ ) and 2b|T t | + 2 to φ k P (S, c ′ , c).
• If we add a candidate c it to S, then we add 2b to φ k P (S, c, c ′ ) if c t ∈ S and 4b otherwise. Additionally, we add 2b to φ k P (S, c ′ , c) if there is no other c it ′ ∈ S, otherwise we add to it something that is greater than or equal to 4b. Note that we have used the fact that k ≥ 4, as we would only add 2b to both values if k was equal to 3.
From these observations, we can derive the following rules:
1. If {c it , c it ′ } ⊂ S with t = t ′ , then w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≤ w k P (S \ {c it ′ }, c, c ′ ).
2. If c it ∈ S and c t ∈ S, then w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≤ w k P (S \ {c it }, c, c ′ ).
3. If c t ∈ S and ∀x i ∈ S t , c it ∈ S, then w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≤ w k P (S \ {c t }, c, c ′ ).
Stated differently, while rule 1 states that, to maximize w k P (S, c, c ′ ), we should keep no more than one candidate c it per element x i , rules 2 and 3 state that there should be a candidate c it in S iff there should also be candidate c t .
Let us now consider a set S ∈ ∆ m cc ′ verifying rules 1, 2 and 3 that includes one candidate c it for s elements {x i 1 , . . . , x is } and v set candidates. Then:
Note that if S = {c, c ′ }, then v ≥ 1 and that by rule 1, s ≤ p. If s < p, then w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≤ −2b + 2(b − v) + 1 = 1 − 2v < 0. Hence, if w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≥ 0 then s = p, which further implies that v ≤ b. In this case, it is easy to see that the v sets corresponding to the set candidates in S form a valid set cover of X as {x i 1 , . . . , x is } = X , v ≤ b and S verifies rule 2. To summarize, making the assumption that w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≥ 0, we have showed that we could build a valid set cover of X from S. Consequently, this implies that if the set cover instance admits no valid set cover, then max S∈∆ m cc ′ w k P (S, c, c ′ ) < 0.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists a subcollection {T i 1 , . . . , T iv } with v ≤ b sets that covers X . We consider a set S such that {c i 1 , . . . , c iv , c, c ′ } ⊂ S and such that for each x i ∈ X , S contains exactly one candidate c it where x i ∈ T t and t ∈ I := {i 1 , . . . , i v }. Then, simple calcula show that:
Hence, w k P (S, c, c ′ ) ≥ 1 and max S∈∆ m cc ′ w k P (S, c, c ′ ) > 0.
